KRI Brown Bag Seminar #4: 'Evolving Cultural Assumptions of the Malaysian Chinese Community and the Language of Politics'

On 27 September 2017, guest speakers Rita Sim and Fui K Soong from the Centre for Strategic Engagement (CENSE), presented at the fourth KRI Brown Bag Seminar on a topic titled “The Evolving Cultural Assumptions of the Malaysian Chinese Community and the Language of Politics”.  

The Evolving Cultural Assumptions of the Malaysian Chinese Community and the Language of Politics

Rita and Fui began by highlighting that the Malaysian Chinese community are a significant minority, forming 23.2% of the total Malaysian population as of 2017. They suggested based on anecdotal evidence that this segment of the Malaysian population is shrinking, which indicates a gradual diminishing of their effective political voice, fewer economic positions in the public sector (confined to the private sector/SMEs), and the polarization of their cultural status.

Rita and Fui informed that the existing Malaysian Chinese community can be broadly categorized into three groups—the G1, G2, and G3. The G1 and G2 are characterized as being Chinese literate and non-Chinese literate, respectively, with the G3 being the overlap. Rita and Fui proposed that the G1 are anchored by 3 distinct pillars. The first pillar is education, specifically ‘Chinese education’, followed by the second pillar—clans and associations—with over 7,000 Chinese guilds and associations. The third pillar is media, ranging from various mediums such as newspapers, radio stations, television and numerous Chinese online portals, all of each with various selections. Today, the G2 is the smallest group among the Malaysian Chinese community, but Rita and Fui contended that they are among the most vocal, or at least they appear to be, largely because of their use of English, which stands as the main language of advertising and is understandable by those outside the Chinese community. Meanwhile the G3 now stand as the biggest group in the Malaysian Chinese community, and many are likely tri-lingual. This is because many have attended Chinese primary schools, thereafter continuing into either independent Chinese secondary school, Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan, or private schools, and into tertiary education in local or overseas institutions.

The presenters noted that Chinese primary school enrolment has fallen, particularly between 2000 and 2016, due to falling birth-rates, increasing enrolment into international schools and home schooling. Interestingly, this is also despite increasing enrolment into Chinese schools by non-Chinese ethnic groups, which is at an all-time high of 18%.

Moving on, Rita and Fui highlighted several changing trends in the society. One of them is the rise of China and how it has impacted the Malaysian Chinese identity. They observed the rise in the use of Mandarin coupled with the decline in the use of other Chinese dialects among the community. Research by CENSE suggest that in the case of the Klang Valley, the population has shifted from being mostly Cantonese/Hokkien speaking to Mandarin. This is first, due to internal migration of other Chinese dialect groups that led many to prefer using Mandarin as a common medium of communication when interacting; and second due to the rise in Mandarin language education among the younger generations. Furthermore, findings from CENSE research suggest that the Malaysian Chinese community are largely pragmatic in their worldview, where the appeal of Mandarin is one that is rooted in its cosmopolitan and commercial outlook.

Other changing trends highlighted by the Rita and Fui during the presentation include the influences of Taiwan and Hong Kong political aspirations; China’s trade and rapid digitization and how Malaysian SME companies are playing catch-up; and assertions that China’s businesses in the country posing possible threat to the competitiveness of the Malaysian Chinese community.

Rita and Fui shared some of the findings from a survey conducted by CENSE in 2015. One of the questions asked were ‘what do urbanites want?’. Rita and Fui revealed that among the twelve answers, the one with the most votes were “strong economic growth”, at 38.7%, followed by “having enough money” and “getting on well with one’s family”. The survey also asked whether they think that the advantages of China investment in Malaysia outweighs its disadvantages. The presenters revealed that across all ethnic groups, most agreed, with the Chinese being the most optimistic (63.6%), followed by the Indians (49.2%) and the Malays (44.3%). The proportion of those that disagree, across all ethnic groups, were much less, at an average of 21%. With regards to the Malaysian concerns on China’s investment in Malaysia, Rita and Fui revealed that the most prominent worry across all ethnic groups is an increase in property prices, with 37% of the interviewees stating so.

In the second half of the presentation, Rita and Fui touched on the topic revolving the language of politics, and how it impacts the Malaysian Chinese community in terms of public policy. They posed the question of how the following developments have affected the language of politics:

• Is Bahasa Malaysia a cultural unifier?
• Islamization & hudud law—driving ethnic groups further apart?
• Minority status—equality or minority rights?
• Is Mandarin the only competitive advantage in the great China and ASEAN?
• Can the community cope with the rapid changes taking place in the Greater China and ASEAN?
• Political culture—how does China sit on this in the future?

The presenters briefly discussed the Malay community in the perspective of the Malaysian Chinese community. Rita and Fui highlighted that the existing anchors of the Malay community can be quite unclear. However, they have come to conceptualize that Religion and ‘Malay Power’ are the two pillars that govern the dynamics of the Malay community. They classified the Malay ethnic into three groups comprising (1) the ‘Traditional’ group that comprised of royal houses; (2) the ‘Old’ group comprising political elite that includes UMNO, PAS and PKR; and (3) the ‘New Elite’ group which includes intellectuals and activists, G25 and IDEAS, among others. In their view, the third group which is the ‘New Elite’ is contesting the Malay space against the ‘Old’ and ‘Traditional’ group and driving change within the Malay community.

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